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Socialist Legality and Uncensored Literature in the
Soviet Union
by Kazimierz Grzybowski*
The author discuses the role of Samizdat literature in publicizing the abuse of legal
process in the Soviet Union. Trials of dissidents and the persecution of minorities go
unreported or are distorted in the censored media. Despite reform in the legal system
during Krushchev's regime, Stalinist techniques persist. As many Smaizdat documents
indicate, a double standard of legality exists in the Soviet Union.
I. POLITICAL AIMS OF SAMIZDAT
T HE OVERALL POLITICAL aim of the intellectual opposition
and Samizdat (self-published) activists was the struggle for the
realization of individual and human rights guaranteed by the Soviet
Constitution, and in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
As Paval Litvinov, the son of Maxim Litvinov and one of the
leaders of the intellectual opposition, explained in an interview in
England, where he was in exile, the purpose of the Samizdat publica-
tions was to protest against the regime's practices and to force Soviet
authorities to respect Soviet laws, however imperfect they may be.
Samizdat and its activities were not seeking to change the regime. Ac-
cording to Litvinov, intellectual opposition was not engaged in a
political action. The struggle for human rights was not in conflict with
Soviet state ideology, and Samizdat activists did not attack the social or
economic order of the Soviet state, but sought to "enlarge"-as Lit-
vinov put it-"the area of political debate by creating publicity and
giving the people an opportunity to voice their views and engage in
discussion"' The ideological stance of the opposition may be best
described as proceeding from the position of Communism insisting that
the Soviet state, existing to establish Communist order in the Soviet
society, should live by its own laws which guarantee minimum rights .to
a Soviet citizen. In his attack on censorship, Solzhenitsyn, though not a
Marxist, called for the abolition of censorship as contrary to the Soviet
legal regime.
This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit-not provid-
ed for in the Constitution and therefore illegal, and nowhere official-
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, VI (1), at 6-8 (1975).
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ly labelled as such- is imposing a yoke on our literature and gives
people who are unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers.
A survivial of the Middle Ages, censorship manages in a
Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existence almost to the 21st
century. Of fleeting significance, it attempts to appropriate unto
itself the role of unfleeting time-of separating the good books from
the bad.'
Even in the writings of the leading personalities of the Samizdat
literature, there is little quarrel with the laws, or philosophy, or even
authoritarianism of the Soviet state. Only Solzhenitsyn desires
modification of some features of the Soviet economic order. Medvedev
and Sakharov stress the need to change the policies of the Soviet Union
(both internal and international) characteristic of the Stalinist regime
(i.e., imperialism, suppression of freedom, and terror) to assure greater
prosperity and a freer style of life.'
Acceptance of the Soviet regime by the leading opinion makers of
the intellectual opposition went so far as to uphold the leading role of
the party. Solzhenitsyn, who goes further than Sakharov and Medvedev
in his outline of the future of Russia, endorses the idea of the con-
tinued Party rule. 4 In effect, Samizdat activists have set out a com-
paratively modest program, and in opposition not so much to the
Soviet state as to the practices inherited from Stalin's regime.
Samizdat was a reaction to the disappointed high hopes of Soviet
intellectuals following the death of Stalin. In October 1954, Fadeev,
Stalin's henchman in the Writers Union, was removed from control of
the Writers Union, and Nory Mir, a leading literary journal in the
Soviet Union, promised a new era for Soviet literature. Party conser-
vatives entrenched in the Union forced the Novy Mir to retract. This
provoked the liberals and the great debate about the future of Soviet
literature opened up, with liberals going back to the original ideas of
the Revolutionary period about the role of literature and art in
socialist society. When conservatives won the debate, and liberal voices
were silenced, Samizdat, a record of the struggle with the process of
2 Letter to the Congress of the Writers of the Soviet Union (May 16, 1967),
SOBRANIE DOKUMENTOV SAMIZDATA No. 175 (AS 175).
3 See A. SOLZHENITSYN, LETTER TO THE SOVIET LEADERS (1975); A. SAKHAROV,
PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM (1968); R. MEDVEDEV, THE
ESSAY OF OUR DAY, AS 306.
4 A. SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 3, at 67 ff.
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re-Stalinization of the intellectual life in the Soviet Union, came into
being. 5
II. THE ISSUES
Samizdat was a reaction to the role of the Soviet press in the strug-
gle for the liberalization of Soviet intellectual life. Important events
were either not reported or passed over in silence. Sometimes untrue
information was published, or outright lies fed to the Soviet public.
Without Samizdat the public would not have been informed of the
plight of Jews, Tartars, religious minorities, and the trials of dissidents.
In the historic struggle for the liberalization of the intellectual life
in the Soviet Union, the Soviet press sided with the regime and the
conservative trend.
Pavel Litvinov-who assembled a record of one of the dissident's
trials-had the following conversation with KGB (Committee on
Government Security) Agent Gostev.
Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have knowledge that you, together
with a group of people, intend to reproduce and distribute the
minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn
you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.
Litvinov: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what
the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.
Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you
that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities
or appear abroad, you will be held responsible for this. . . . In
general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind Vechernaia Moskva
(Moscow Evening News) has printed all that the Soviet people should
know about this case and this information is completely true ...
The issue in this instance was that the Soviet press reported that
Bukovsky pleaded guilty, when in fact he did not. 6
A. The Jewish Question
One of the most striking examples of distortion of truth is informa-
tion on the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.
For years, the Soviet government followed a policy of restriction of
Jews. This policy continued unabated even after the death of Stalin.
K. GRZYBOWSKI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION
24 (1972).
6 AS 168. See also AS 175, 176, 176a, 178.
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Although the more drastic forms of the persecution of Jews were
discontinued, the policy of squeezing them out from positions of trust,
professions, and cultural activities was practiced with equal vigor
under Khrushchev and his successors, both by the central government
as well as by the governments of the republics in which Jews were pres-
ent in any number. Something of the Soviet Jewish policy can be seen
from the letter of February 2, 1968 by twenty-six representatives of the
Jewish intelligentsia addressed to the First Secretary of the Communist
Party of Lithuania, A. Snieckus. The letter complains about the effect
of the anti-Israeli propaganda on the position of Jews in the Soviet
Union: Caricatures appearing in the national and local press incite
anti-Semitism. Articles in the Lithuanian press ridicule the Jews. Jews
are omitted from the selection of candidates for positions in govern-
ment, teaching, and culture. Jews are never granted scholarships to in-
stitutions of higher learning in Leningrad or Moscow, or the Party
Academy of Social Sciences, or admitted to aspirantura. Jews are never
elected to positions of chairman, secretary, or deputy chairman of the
city or ward soviets, nor are they found in higher positions in Lithua-
nian Party organizations. Synagogues and Jewish cemeteries are
systematically destroyed and desecrated. Jewish cultural institutions
have been eliminated.
To make the situation worse - the letter complains - it is impossible
to avoid persecution by emigrating to Israel. While Jews are not
welcome in the Soviet Union, they are not permitted to leave the coun-
try.7
The letter of the twenty-six describes the situation of Jews in the
entire Soviet Union, aggravated by the fact that the Soviet press main-
tains total silence regarding their social and economic condition, in-
dulging at the same time in anti-Israeli propaganda.
8 That this prop-
aganda finds a fertile soil in the Soviet Union is also obvious from
some Samizdat publications.
9
B. The Tartars
Deportation was probably one of the harshest Soviet sanctions
against the nationalities. Under Stalin, entire nations thought to be a
threat to Soviet political power were uprooted from their national ter-
' AS 64.
8 See also AS 104, 110, 118, 336, 338-39, 377, 392, 404, 420, 422, 423, 430,
431, 432, 436, 437, 445, 556, 583, 593, 594, 1026, 1034, 1084.
' See, e.g., Veche, a publication of a Slavophile group, (1971), AS 1013, 1020.
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ritories and dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. Under
Khrushchev, decrees ordering uprooting and dispersal were abolished
and the nations punished by dispersal were rehabilitated. Five of
them-the Balkars, Kalmyks, Karachais, Chechen, and Chechen-
Ingush -were permitted to return to their native lands. There were
two exceptions: the Volga Germans and Crimean Tartars. Their lands
had been settled by the Ukrainians and Russians and there was no
room for the possible returnees.
After the denunciation of Stalin, a number of Tartars tried to
return to Crimea and were forcibly removed, again deported, and
tried for various violations of the law. Their plight aroused the Soviet
liberals, and various uncensored magazines (e.g., Chronicle of Current
Events and Journal of Politics) reported regularly on the prosecution of
Tartars, while the appeals of Tartars to Soviet authorities received
wide circulation. A number of oppositions activists, among them
General Grigorenko, espoused their cause, appealing for a change of
policy, earning in the process confinement in a psychiatric ward.10
C. Soviet Minorities
Anti-Semitism and dispersal of nations are only aspects of the
general nationality policy, frequently complained of in the Samizdat
publications as evidence of the continuation of the Stalinist regime.
Charges of forcible Russification emerge from all corners of the Soviet
Union. Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians protest against the
dispersal of their compatriots to other parts of the Soviet Union, and
the Russification of their educational institutions, the government, the
Party, and the economic administration. Special attention was paid in
Samizdat publications to the trials of Ukrainians for nationalism.'
Samizdat documents the persecution of the religious minorities, in
particular, the Baptist congregations. Soviet authorities dispersed their
meetings, and opposed their organization into regular religious com-
munities. There were even cases where children of members of the
Baptist church were seized and removed from paternal homes and
placed in the care of a governmental educational institution. Anti-
Baptist action seems to be motivated by security reasons due to the
10 AS 40, 45, 86, 137, 152, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 319, 379, 396, 397, 398,
399, 400, 402, 501-07, 520, 580, 1033.
1 AS 15, 29, 39, 40, 45, 77, 86, 91, 101, 114, 167, 248, 280, 1042.
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connections of the Baptists with their brethren in the West, particular-
ly in the United States.
12
D. Secret Trials
Secret elimination of political opponents of the regime either
through physical liquidation or confinement in the forced labor camps
is no longer officially practiced in the Soviet Union. In 1956, the
punitive powers of the Ministry of Interior were abolished, and the
Criminal Code of 1960 established in Article 3, the principle that:
"Only persons guilty of committing a crime, that is, who intentionally
or negligently commit a socially dangerous act provided for by law,
shall be subject to criminal responsibility and punishment. Criminal
punishment shall be applied only by judgment of a court." The princi-
ple was repeated in Article 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which also provided for the participation of laymen on the bench (Ar-
ticle 15) and the publicity of trials (Article 18). Although the new
Codes fell short in many respects of standards reached by modern
criminal law, at least in this respect it seemed that abuse of judicial
power for political purposes had been seriously limited. Open trials
and control of public opinion promised to rule out staged trials, forced
confessions of guilty, and abuse of judicial power.
Another guarantee which the new Codes granted the Soviet people
was court and procurator control of investigations and criminal pro-
ceedings. It seemed that under the new legal order arbitrary arrests
would come to an end.
It is the duty of the procurator, the law states:
to exercise supervision, so that no one is subjected to arrest, otherwise
than in accordance with a decree of a court or with the sanction of a
procurator; in deciding the question of sanction for arrest the pro-
curator shall carefully acquaint himself with all the materials upon
which the arrest is founded and when necessary shall personally inter-
rogate the accused or suspect. (Arts. 11 and 211(1)(d)).
It may be argued that this is far less than the generally accepted
standard of the administration of justice, where the rule is that an ar-
rest is within the exclusive competence of the courts, or can be
challenged in the courts (habeas corpus). However, the law now pro-
vides that police and security organs shall no longer be in exclusive
control of criminal investigations, particularly in politically sensitive
cases.
12 AS 83, 113, 115, 121, 155, 322, 325, 442, 515, 544, 545, 582, 1039, 1061,
1087.
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Samizdat materials, in particular, materials covering details of
criminal trials involving dissenters, demonstrate that in all politically
sensitive cases guarantees of fairness and legality are of no avail. The
usual technique is to prevent publicity about trials and the publishing
of objective reports of tried cases. Two techniques are used. In the first
place, although trials are formally open, admission to court rooms is
controlled, and audiences are packed with agents of the secret police
(KGB) or militia. Even relatives of persons standing trial are not ad-
mitted, and reports appearing in the Soviet press misrepresent the
facts.
The obvious purpose of these practices is to prevent public
knowledge of the fact that government processes and policies of the
regime are challenged on account of their shortcomings in terms of
practical democracy and respect for individual rights.
As Bukovsky, one of the accused charged with illegally
demonstrating in the streets of Moscow, said in court:
Freedom of speech and of the press is, first of all, freedom of
criticism. Nobody has ever forbidden the praise of government. If in
the Constitution there are articles about freedom of speech and of
the press, then have patience to listen to criticism. In what kind of
countries is it forbidden to criticize the government and protest
against its actions? Perhaps in capitalist countries? No, we know that
in bourgeois countries Communist Parties exist, whose purpose is to
undermine the capitalist system. In the USA the Communist Party
was suppressed. However, the Supreme Court declared that the sup-
pression was unconstitutional and restored the Communist Party to
its full rights."
In effect the packing of court rooms and slanted reporting in the
press removed the need for confessions of the Stalinist period and pro-
duced identical results in terms of the isolation of political opposition
from the Soviet people.
The by-product of the process of suppression of the political op-
position in the 1960's was the distorted interpretation of provisions of
the Criminal Code, especially Article 70 of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic) Code. Under that Article two Soviet
authors, Syniavsky and Daniel, were charged and sentenced for a
crime which according to Article 70 consisted of "Agitation or pro-
paganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening of
Soviet authority or of committing particular, especially dangerous
13 AS 163.
14 Izvestia, Jan. 13, 1966, at 6.
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crimes against the state, or circulating for the same purpose slanderous
fabrications which defame the Soviet state and the social system ... "
The criminal deeds of the two authors consisted of sending and
publishing abroad works which criticized so-called "Socialist Realism,"
a canon of art adopted by the Party and enforced by the authorities in
charge of cultural activities. How on earth could books published
abroad on the theory of art in the Soviet Union subvert the Soviet state
or defame its social system? That is beyond comprehension. The trial
was carried on in secrecy by the technique of packing the court, and
Izvestia on the eve of the trial assured the public (even before the
charges were heard) that: "The actions of Syniavsky and Daniel fall
directly under Article 70 of the Criminal Code. The two deliberately
and secretly sent our enemies works that, of course, evoked hostile at-
titudes toward Soviet rule, served as ammunition for ideological
subversion against our country, and damaged the prestige of the Soviet
state." 14 Similar articles appeared in other papers, including Pravda,
and the matter ended with a spate of articles applauding conviction.
At the same time there was no coverage of the proceedings in the
court for the reader's information and consideration.
Trials of the dissenters were not the only occasions for judicial
techniques of this type. Even more cavalierly were treated defendants
charged with economic crimes, frequently members of the national
minority groups.' 5
III. SURVIVALS OF STALINISM
Courts, police, and the press dealing with political opposition to
governmental practices in the area of cultural policies aim primarily at
assuring the monolithic moral outlook of the Soviet society and full ap-
proval of government policies. From the perspective of the West, the
Soviet authorities' concern over the publishing of works abroad, and
the protests against the treatment of Jews, Tartars, and the political
dissenters, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the right of the Baptists
to practice their own religion seems out of place and nearly incom-
prehensible. Is the regime really endangered by the presence of a few
people in public squares and avenues with placards protesting a policy,
or by the conviction of a few dissenters, events which have not aroused
public curiosity or indignation? One may wonder about the sense of
" See Grzybowski, Economic Crimes in the Soviet Union, 5 J. INT'L COMMISSION
JURISTS 1 (1964).
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security and stability felt by the Soviet leaders governing a country that
they have brought to the position of a super power in the present
world. A number of answers may be suggested, but none of them will
be wholly satisfactory. So the answer to that-perhaps the most impor-
tant question - shall not be attempted.
It is possible, however, to find an answer to a less political issue,
namely, to what extent de-Stalinization, as demonstrated by the legal
reforms of the late fifties and early sixties, represents a real change in
the Soviet regime of social control.
The first observation which must be made concerns Article 125 of
the Soviet Constitution. It provides for a catalog of rights that may be
enjoyed: "In conformity with the interests of the working people, and
in order to strengthen the socialist, system, citizens of the USSR are
guaranteed by law various rights" including: freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom to hold meetings,
and freedom of street procession and demonstration. These civil rights,
the Constitution goes on to say, are ensured by placing at the disposal
of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks
of paper, public buildings, the streets, communication facilities, and
other material requisite for the exercise of these rights. The rights in-
cluding various forms of self-expression are not granted to individuals.
If the wording of the Constitution suggests that a more liberal in-
terpretation is not excluded, in practice all forms of self-expression are
granted to and may be exercised by the collectives. But, in addition,
all forms of self-expression, meetings, demonstrations, and processions
require licenses, while dailies, magazines, and publications are not only
controlled by various social and governmental organizations including
the Communist Party, but are also subject to preliminary censorship.
As a matter of fact, persons performing the functions of censors are
frequently found on editorial boards, in positions such as editor-in-
chief, and are part of the establishment.
Ziemiatin, when he was editor-in-chief of Pravda, speaking in the
House of the Press on October 5, 1967, stated that in his official
capacity he had to read the unpublished works of Solzhenitsyn, in par-
ticular Feast of the Victors written in 1941, one copy of which had
been confiscated by the security police, and had been reprinted and
circulated among the members of the censoring community.' 6
Ziemiatin also found that Voznesensky's complaint, against the Writers
Union's withdrawal of permission for him to go to the United States,
"s AS 176.
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which was put in a letter to him and the Central Committee, and
broadcast by the BBC, was anti-Soviet. "I told him [Voznesensky],"
Ziemiatin said, ". . . if he ever did it again he would be ground to dust.
I myself would see to it that not a trace of him remained."' 7 Ap-
parently, when he spoke, Ziemiatin had already made up his mind to
destroy Solzhenitsyn.
Seen in the perspective of the present day the main purpose of
dissident action is to assure public scrutiny of governmental actions,
hence the constant concern with the content of the Soviet media. The
purpose of the scrutiny is to assure faithful adherence of the courts,
police, and procuracy to the proper (liberal) interpretation of the law
in force. Dissidents were convinced that enactment of new articles in
the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, specially directed against various
manifestations of nonconformism, would be inconsistent with the
regime established in the Constitution, and contrary to the idea of the
Leninist democracy. The Decree of the Presidium (Ukaz) of the
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of October 16, 1966, added two new
definitions of prohibited acts under a penalty. Article 190 prohibits the
knowing systematic spreading of untrue inventions defaming the Soviet
governmental and social structure, and the preparation of such
statements for dissemination in written, printed, or other form. Article
190 provides a penalty for the organization of and participation in
group activities that seriously disturb the social order, or combine with
open noncompliance with the legal demands of the representatives of
authority, or result in the disturbance of the work of transport, or
governmental or social institutions or enterprises.
A protest against the Decree introducing these two new articles ex-
pressed the fear that it would create an opportunity to determine sub-
jectively and arbitrarily any statement as knowingly untrue, and
defamatory of the Soviet governmental and social order.'"
In order to see the significance of the Ukaz and of the articles add-
ed to the Criminal Code one must realize that Soviet authorities
resorted to a practice that was not repudiated by the Congresses of the
Party in the post-Stalin era.
There seems to be little in the program of reform outlined by the
1956 Party Congress, at which Khrushchev delivered his famous speech
on the abuses of Stalin's regime, that justified the high hopes of the
dissidents. The immediate task set by the Congress was to repair the
17 Id.
Is AS 158.
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damage to the Soviet ship of state by the "cult of personality" - a label
for policies and governmental techniques that relied on use of force
and dictatorial forms of government with little respect for legal rules
or democratic processes. The socialist state was to give meaning to the
rule of its law. Since the Twenty-First Congress of the Party in 1959,
the reform of the legal system has acquired a new sense because, as the
Congress stated, the time has come to reorganize all phases of Soviet
life. The time was thought to be ripe because of the upsurge of
economic forces in the Soviet society upon which the dawn of com-
munism would bring about total liquidation of the methods of coer-
cion by the state.19
From the perspective of the present day it is clear that the de-
Stalinization campaign was only a political device to win the contest
for power which was fought among the aspirants to Stalin's mantle.
The two Congresses were by no means an expression of the same
basic policy. Following the 1959 Congress it became quite apparent
that while return to Stalin's terror was no longer feasible, Soviet public
life must still be rigidly controlled by the Party and Moscow-centered
bureaucracy which survived Krushchev's attempt at dispersal. The
basic purpose of the 1959 Congress was to introduce new methods of
control. Almost immediately upon the reform of the criminal legisla-
tion, came the law on Increased Participation of Society in the Strug-
gle with Violations of Socialist Legality. It was followed in 1962 by
legislation dealing with the confiscation of houses and automobiles ac-
quired by citizens with unearned income. Somewhat earlier, in 1961,
the first antiparasite law was enacted in the RSFSR. Simultaneously
the campaign against economic crimes was started. In the end, a com-
paratively short period of liberalization, with the powers of the police
circumscribed and with greater respect for the law and individual
rights,2 0 was followed by a new wave of regimentation, social control,
and restriction of private property rights. Freedom of expression was
again seriously restricted, as Soviet leaders grasped the subversive im-
pact of the new type of literature. That, indeed, this is a correct
analysis of the events following the Khrushchev speech is confirmed by
the decision of the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 to adopt a
new Party Program.
'9 See K. GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 241-42 (1962).
20 In 1958 Romashkin, Director of the Institute of State and Law in the USSR
Academy of Science, complained that the issue of individual rights attracted no atten-
tion among Soviet scholars. SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, 1958, No. 10, at 3.
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The chapter of the Program dealing with the tasks of the Party in
the spheres of ideology, education, instruction, science, and culture
begins with the following statement:
Soviet society has made great progress in the socialist education of
the masses, in the molding of active builders of socialism. But even
after the socialist system has triumphed there persists in the minds
and behavior of people survivals of capitalism, which hamper the
progress of society.
The Party considers that the paramount task in the ideological field
in the present period is to educate all work-people in a spirit of
ideological integrity and devotion to communism. . . . to eliminate
completely the survival of bourgeois views and morals, to create a
truly rich spiritual culture. . . .
In section 4 of the same chapter, the Program states:
Soviet literature and art, imbued with optimism and dynamic com-
munist ideas, are great factors in ideological education and cultivate
in Soviet people the qualities of builders of a new world. They must
be a source of joy and inspiration to millions of peoples, express their
will, their sentiment and ideas, enrich them ideologically and educate
them morally.
The highroad of literature and art lies through the strengthening of
their bond with the life of the people, through faithful and highly ar-
tistic depiction of the richness and diversity of socialist reality, in-
spired and vivid portrayal of all that is new and genuinely com-
munist, and exposure of all that hinder the progress of society.
In the art of socialist realism, which is based on the principle of par-
tisanship and kinship with the people, bold pioneering and depiction
of life goes hand-in-hand with the cultivation and development of the
progressive traditions of world culture. Writers, artists, musicians,
theatrical workers, and film makers have every opportunity of
displaying creative initiative and skill, using manifold forms, styles,
and genres.
One must ask oneself the question: Is the realization of the pro-
gram possible without censorship and thought control? The analysis of
Solzhenitsyn in his letter of May 1967 to the Writers Congress is quite
to the point: "Our writers are not supposed to have the right, they are
not endowed with the right, to express their anticipatory judgments
about the moral life of man and society, or to explain in their own
[Vol. 10:299
SOCIALIST LEGALITY
way the social problems of the historical experience that has been so
deeply felt in our country."'"
IV. ECONOMIC CRIMES-AN ANALOGY
As was said above the plan of the legal reform was hardly liberal in
its main content. Almost immediately upon the enactment of the
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure Soviet authorities
began to replace Stalinist controls by new legislation that would assure
conformism without Stalin's terror.
The first important departure from the principles laid down in the
Codes came with the antiparasite legislation and laws on the participa-
tion of society in crime prevention. These enactments were followed by
legislation aimed at what was called economic crimes, in direct conflict
with the principles of the Code of 1960. Firstly, the principle that
Soviet criminal legislation should be stable and criminal policy general
rather than specific was not followed. Secondly, and this was a major
feature of the special decrees, the death penalty was introduced on a
large scale despite the promise made in Article 22 of the General Prin-
ciples of Criminal Legislation that the death penalty would be an ex-
ceptional punishment, to be eventually abolished.
The first of these decrees, dated March 25, 1961, addeda second
paragraph to Article 25 of the Law on Crimes Against the State of
December 1958 (Article 88 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of
1960), which sharply increased penalties for illegal currency transac-
tions either when committed by a professional criminal or when large
sums of money were involved. 22
Next came the Decree of May 5, 1961, which introduced the death
penalty by shooting for a number of crimes, including large-scale theft
of state and social property, professional counterfeiting, and other
crimes committed by dangerous recidivists, or persons serving sentences
for serious crimes. 23 The Decree of May 24, 1961, penalized fraud in
planning accounts. 24 The Decree of July 1, 1961, again raised the
penalties for serious forms of illegal currency transactions,; providing
for the application of capital punishment in more serious cases.25 The
Decree of February 15, 1962, introduced new rules aimed at the pro-
"1 AS 175.
22 VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1961, No. 13/137.
23 Id., 1961, No. 19/207.
24 Id., 1961, No. 22/225.
21 Id., 1961, No. 27/291.
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tection of the members of the militia and the members of the Volun-
tary People's Brigades (an auxiliary policy force).2 6 This Decree was
followed the same day by a Decree which introduced the death penalty
for aggravated cases of rape (committed by a dangerous recidivist or a
gang).27 Finally, the Decree of February 20, 1962, provided for in-
creased penalties, including the death penalty, for officials accepting
bribes. 28
Thus the sharp edge of exceptionally severe punishment was not
aimed exclusively at offenders against the economic interests of the
Soviet state. It was also concerned with affording special protection to
new forms of social discipline which had been introduced by the
legislation on the participation of the population in crime prevention
(Decree of February 15, 1962). It singled out for harsher treatment in-
corrigible criminals and certain forms of criminal activity. In addition,
Soviet special decrees were also concerned with the protection of in-
mates of penal institutions and of the administrative personnel
employed in such establishments against the attacks of hardened and
particularly dangerous criminals.
The exceptional decrees in all their categories reflect a sense of
disillusion over the corrective effect of normal measures in protecting
certain infportant social interests. They demonstrate a doubt whether
some criminals (recidivists and professionals) can be morally
rehabilitated. They also are designed to convince the public that the
use of the auxiliary police force in order to establish a system of tight
supervision over the activities of all citizens, even in their private life, is
a measure to which the regime attaches great significance. The death
penalty in cases of attacks on members of the militia and the auxiliary
police force is used as a deterrent. The death penalty is also provided
for breaches of discipline by certain inmates of corrective institutions.
There seems to be little doubt that harsh punishments for
economic crimes, theft and embezzlement of government and social
property, trade in foreign currencies, gold, and securities, and for the
giving and taking of bribes are also designed to deter rather than to
correct. Their main purpose is to keep the potential offenders on the
path of virtue by fear.
Another important feature of the special legislation enacted in
1961 and 1962 was that in the eyes of the regime economic crimes
26 Id., 1962, No. 8/83.
21 Id., 1962, No. 8/84.
28 Id., 1962, No. 8/85.
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represented a singular danger to its plans and interests. Of the seven
special decrees, two dealt with illegal currency transactions, one with
counterfeiting, one with the theft of state or social property, one with
fraud in planning accounts, and one with bribery of officials.
It is clear that the policy of using special decrees to amend the
Criminal Codes in a spirit contrary to the original aims of the legal
reform has established itself in the Soviet legal system, probably
because of the apprehensions caused by popular reaction to the milder
course. The system of harsh penalties for economic crimes brings
readily to mind the special measures that were usually the feature of
Communist legislation directed against class enemies in order to en-
force the transfer to public ownership of privately-owned factories and
commercial institutions. Now, after more than forty years of the Soviet
regime, special legislation can no longer be explained by the presence
of the class enemy, but must be attributed to other causes no less
dangerous to the interests of the Soviet policy. It is clear that the pur-
pose of the decrees is to deal with a phenomenon which is a serious
threat to the social and economic order. That economic crimes for a
number of reasons figured chiefly in the mind of the regime is attested
by the instructions of the plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court,
which pointed out to the courts that the vast punitive powers given to
the courts were meant to be used in the struggle with economic crimes.
After the Decrees of May and July 1961, the Court pointed out:
[I]n hearing cases of (especially dangerous) crimes the courts commit
serious errors, which consist of underappraisal of the social danger of
these crimes and the resultant imposition of light penalties, par-
ticularly in cases of pilfering state or public property in especially
large amounts.29
An important item in the fight of the dissenters is criticism of the
conduct of the trials of members of the intellectual opposition. By no
means is this treatment unique in the post-Stalin annals of Soviet
justice. Again a case from the great number of cases tried under
special decrees may serve as a useful illustration.
The first major case that came within the application of the excep-
tional decrees was reported in the Moscow Pravda of June 16, 1961. It
concerned a number of people, of whom J.T. Rokotov, V.P.
Faibishenko, and Edlis (all Jews) were mentioned by name. According
29 Ruling of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, Mar. 31, 1962, SOT-
SIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNOST, 1962, No. 5.
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to the indictment the defendants had in "a relatively short time bought
and resold foreign currency and gold coins of a total value of more
than twenty million rubles (old currency)." The criminal activity of the
defendants had been a source of unearned income for a considerable
group of people and had furthered the illegal export of Soviet money
and foreign currencies abroad and the development of smuggling and
speculation in goods.
The hearings established that the defendants: Refused to work
honestly in the interests of society, had pursued a parasitic way of life
and, through currency speculation, had extracted an unearned ,in-
come and enriched themselves. The defendants Rokotov,
Faibishenko, Edlis and others, for purposes of buying currency and
goods, had systematically met with citizens from capitalist countries
who smuggled these valuables into our country and then had resold
them at speculative prices. By engaging in such criminal dealings,
they had debased the dignity of the Soviet man. All the defendants
on trial had fully admitted their guilt and gave extensive evidence on
their criminal activity and about their accomplices in the currency
speculation.
The defendants were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment
and, as Pravda assured its readers, the decision of the court "met With
the unanimous approval of all persons present in the courtroom." The
defendants were brought to justice by the security police (Committee
for State Security) and were charged and sentenced under the Decree
of March 1961, which provided higher penalties for "violating the
regulations on currency operations and for speculation in currency."
The higher authorities, however, were not satisfied with the out-
come of the trial. The USSR Prosecutor-General appealed the sentence
of the Moscow City Court, which imposed upon Rokotov and
Faibishenko the maximum penalty which the law in force provided,
fifteen years of deprivation of freedom. The case went to the Supreme
Court of the RSFSR, which tried the defendants under the new charge
that they "regularly and for profit bought large amounts of foreign
currency and gold coins and sold them at speculative prices." In the
meantime Article 25 of the Law on Crimes Against the State was
changed; this dealt with violations of the regulations on foreign curren-
cy operations, and now permitted the imposition of the death penalty
(Decree of July 1, 1961). The RSFSR Supreme Court, having reviewed
the case on appeal, sentenced Rokotov and Faibishenko to death by
shooting .30
'0 Pravda, July 21, 1963.
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The Court established that the volume of financial operations
handled by Rokotov amounted to twelve million old rubles, and those
credited to Faibishenko to one million. Again the public put the stamp
of its approval on the proceedings and the sentence.
The Rokotov and Faibishenko case raises several important legal
questions. In the first place there is the question of the law under
which they were tried. It may be assumed that many of the activities
with which the defendants were charged took place under the Law on
Crimes Against the State of December 25, 1958, and most of them, if
not all, prior to the first amendment of Article 25 of that Law by the
Decree of March 1961, as the first trial took place on June 16, 1961. If
that is so, then the first sentence of the Moscow City Court imposing
fifteen years deprivation of freedom was contrary to Article 6 of the
General Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and of the
Union Republics, which was incorporated in the Criminal Code of the
RSFSR of 1960, and states: "Whether an act is criminal and
punishable is determined by the law in force at the time of its commis-
sion. . . A law which makes an action punishable or increases the
penalty has no retroactive force."
This provision was introduced as a result of the reform initiated in
December 1958, and the language of Article 6 suggests that Soviet
legislators were highly concerned that this fundamental principle of
orderly penal policy should be firmly entrenched in the legal system of
the Soviet Union. Neither the Principles nor the Code of 1960 permit-
ted exceptions from the non-retroactivity rule, not even by the addi-
tion of a qualifying clause, such as "unless expressly provided for by
the law."
A fortiori, the appeal of the Prosecutor-General of the USSR of the
decision of the Moscow Supreme Court, seeking a higher penalty, was
contrary to the law in force. As the Moscow City Court had already
exceeded its sentencing powers the appeal was fundamentally illegal,
and should have been thrown out of court. Nevertheless, the RSFSR
Supreme Court reviewed the case and applied the Decree, which was
enacted well after the first trial was held, and which by no stretch of
the imagination could pertain to criminal acts committed before that
date. There is good reason to think that there was a return to the
practice of secret decrees in this case."'
31 See Berman, The Dilemma of Soviet Law Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 929,
948-49 (1963).
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The manner in which the Prosecutor-General, the Moscow City
Court, and the RSFSR Supreme Court handled the case made
nonsense of the guarantees of legality enacted in the General Principles
of Criminal Legislation of December 25, 1958, and it would appear
that the decrees of the 1961-62 period have undone the reforms of the
post-Stalin period. The handling of the case by the Soviet judicial and
prosecuting authorities suggests that formal guarantees of legality have
little if any currency, and the courts will not be constrained by the for-
mal requirements of'justice.
The Rokotov case was the first of a great number of crimes tried
under the economic decrees. It was followed by the Frunze affair,32
which involved the organization of production of non-planned goods in
a governmental factory for private profit, and by a number of other
cases, all of which involved speculation in foreign currency or gold, in-
dustrial activities, second-hand cars, or durable consumer goods sold at
great profit. All of them had two things in common. First, the cases
were never fully reported and significant aspects of each particular
case were screened from the public view. Furthermore, the theory ex-
plaining the proliferation of economic crimes was that they were com-
mitted by a small group of persons, mostly members of the Jewish
minority, which was certainly untrue. In the Frunze affair, the
criminal group involved mostly Great Russians, posted in various
departments of the Kirgizian Republic, who exploited their elevated
positions for personal gain. Obviously, the purpose of blaming the
deeds on a few Jews in the factory administration was to hide the fact
that Russians in Kirgizia, which is reduced to the position of a colony
in the Soviet Union, were not real criminals.
V. THE FLEXIBILITY OF SOVIET LEGALITY
Economic crimes are not the only area in which governmental
practices in the Soviet policy depart from the privileges of the reform-
ed Codes. Legislation on parasitism, the practice of deporting
unwelcome members of the society, involving some of the intellectual
dissenters, and the practice of placing dissenters in the lunatic asylums
seem to indicate that the Soviet state in the post-Stalin era cannot af-
ford absolute guarantees of civil rights and must at times resort to
their violation. The Soviet state must live by a double standard of
legality. It is essential, at times, to disregard the guarantees of what we
would call in our legal culture the due process of law, in order to en-
32 See Economic Crimes in the Soviet Union, supra note 15, at 16-21.
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force the aims and goals of the Soviet state. That in the minds of
many there are serious doubts on that score is best demonstrated by
the discussion in the Literaturnaia Gazeta.
In an article of May 23, 1964, the eminent Soviet jurist M.S.
Strogovich argued, with reference to concrete cases, that unless guilt is
fully proved a court should pass the verdict of not guilty. He then add-
ed:
[I]n the period of the cult of the individual, a "theory" was current
among practical workers and theoreticians in the law that "maximum
probability" of guilt was sufficient for conviction. Everyone knows the
damage this "theory" did to our society. Frequently, the source of er-
ror in investigatory and court work lies in equating an accused person
with a guilty one, in regarding a person on trial as a person con-
victed. . . Such reasoning involves prejudice, a one-sided accusatory
approach to trying the case.
In the Literaturnaia Gazeta of August 16, 1964, an Assistant Pro-
secutor named G. Filimonov from the Cheliabinsk District rebutted
Strogovich's argument as follows:
The law gives the investigatory agencies the right to bring charges
against someone, to interrogate him as the accused, and hence to
recognize him as guilty. And the prosecutor brings to trial and, in
criminal proceedings, accuses a person who is already guilty in the
eyes of the investigatory agencies, i.e., in the eyes of authorities. And
the court merely verifies to what extent the individual brought to
trial and accused by the prosecutor is guilty. ...
Filimonov was without doubt adequately describing the prevailing
practice of the Soviet courts. But his blunt way of stating the facts was
an open invitation to criticism. On September 10, 1964, Izvestia car-
ried an article by 0. Chaikovskaia, who traced the origin of
Filimonov's views to the Stalinist period, and added that his position
was far from being an isolated phenomenon: "The ignorance, with
which we are dealing here is malignant. In the years of the cult of the
individual, they would come for a man in the night, and by morning
he would already be called an enemy of the people."
She followed this statement with a short treatise on the basic prin-
ciples of fair criminal procedure: the need for an open trial, with
public examination of the charges and evidence against the accused;
the role of the defense; the role of the courts and the need for their in-
dependence.
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The Strogovich-Chaikovskaia position was further upheld by A.
Gorkin, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, who wrote in
Izvestia on December 1, 1964 "In present-day conditions . . . the
strengthening of citizens' rights and of the inviolability of the person,
freedom, honor, and dignity of man constitute one of the most impor-
tant demands of the party."
The matter might have ended there, except that Filimonov con-
sidered Chaikovskaia's article an insult to his honor and instituted libel
proceedings against her and also against Izvestia. He duly lost his case
on the basis that his position was clearly contrary to the Basic Prin-
ciples of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1958. Izvestia, reporting the
trial (December 19, 1964), again upbraided him for his mistakes and
enjoined him to mend his ways.
The final word belonged to Strogovich, who in the December 17th
issue of Literaturnaia Gazeta dealt with the main issues of the con-
troversy, and drew lessons from it. Strogovich stressed again that
Filimonov was only one of many like-minded colleagues, that his views
were echoed not only by practitioners of law, but in the "pseudoscien-
tific works" of a number of scholars in institutions of higher learning.
The root cause of such attitudes, said Strogovich, was a contempt for
legal theory, including contempt for the changes introduced by the
reform legislation. It was still little understood that to have a system of
justice worth its name, it was essential to insist on a high caliber of
judges, able to uphold the independence of the courts vis-d-vis the
prosecution, and capable of objective examination of all the cir-
cumstances of a case sub judice. In short, without objectivity, justice
was impossible. To support his viewpoint, Strogovich cited various ex-
amples of judicial practice where the principle of impartiality and ob-
jectivity had been ignored. And yet, only a few years later in cases in-
volving intellectual dissenters, the Soviet administration of justice has
relapsed into the practices of the Stalinist period. From the most
general point of view neither the Soviet legal, community, nor the
political leaders of the country, nor the public at large are wholly com-
mitted to the idea of legality, with adjective and due process of law as
this thing is understood in the open societies.
Sobranie Dohumentov Samizdata contains minutes of the trade
union meeting of April 16, 1968, which examined the case of the
teacher V.M. Gerlin, who signed a protest in connection with the trial
Ginzburg, Galanskov, Dobrovoski, and Lashkova.33 As a teacher of
-1 AS 1033.
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literature in advanced classes she was considered unworthy of trust in
regard to her ideological and political views. Her explanation was that
she was concerned with the authority of the law in the Soviet courts,
and her letter was addressed to the Soviet supreme authorities asking
for the review of the trial.
Her explanation was interrupted by a participant. "Must the
enemies of the Soviet Union be judged according to the law?" "Not on-
ly these," answered Gerlin, "but even war criminals." "But they are
enemies." The same person, a teacher of mathematics, reiterated his
position. "We cannot judge criminals according to justice. They would
be declared not guilty." Eventually the meeting was almost unanimous
in declaring the unfitness of teacher Gerlin for further employment.
In the perspective of the events which took place following
Khrushchev's speech in 1956 the Samizdat episode is one 'of many
upheavals in the process of transition to a stable regime not much dif-
ferent from Stalin's public order. The ideological framework in which
the issue of legality was raised was too narrow, and of no immediate
significance for the masses. Dissenters fought for intellectual freedom,
and were not concerned with the rights of ordinary criminals who also
deserved equal protection of the laws.
The issue of anti-Semitism again was seen exclusively in the.
perspective of the right of Soviet Jews to move to Israel. The same call
be said of the treatment of Tartars, or the treatment of Baptists. Each
of these minorities fought in total isolation from the Soviet society
which remained indifferent to their plight. Indeed, the only support
intellectuals, Tartars, Jews, and Baptists had, came from the West. If
it were not for Western media, protests of the oppressed would have
died without a ripple.
VI. CONCLUSION
The general picture one obtains from these insights into the life of
law in the Soviet Union is that long years of Stalinism established the
conviction that power is the deciding factor determining the policy of
the Soviet state, and that abuse of power cannot-in sensitive situa-
tions- be prevented by law. This of course makes protection of in-
dividual rights uncertain.
This general unconcern with the issue of legality is compounded by
the fact that various interests in the Party and government have failed
to accept the new order of things prescribed by the reform legislation
enacted after the 1956 Congress. Powerful bureaucracies still cling to
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old dogmas and bad practices learned under Stalin. Filimonov and
Ziemiatin spoke for the hordes of Soviet bureaucrats who have no in-
tention of abdicating their positions of power, undermined by the
reform legislation.
At the same time reform legislation tends to emphasize the increas-
ed role of the institutions charged with the protection of the legal
order, generating a struggle for more influential positions in the
hierarchy of the Soviet establishment.
An interesting insight into the internal tensions and the power
struggle within the Soviet administration of justice comes from a short
review of a textbook used in the Higher School of Criminal Investiga-
tion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) which appeared in Sot-
sialisticheskaia Zakonnost. 34 The review condemned the textbook in
sharpest terms for distorting the role of the Prokuratura as supervisor
of criminal investigation. The review pointed out that the Prokuratura
not only has the right, but the duty to control criminal investigation
and to prevent violations of the law, particularly of the rights of the
individual. The Prokuratura is the guardian of legality and in this
capacity supervises all stages of investigation until the moment the case
is filed in court. The Prokuror continues to supervise the judicial pro-
cess and the interests of those involved in it, even those of the accused.
Finally, to touch the most important point, the review rebuked the
authors of the textbook for suggesting that in fact agents of the MVD
acted as Prokuror in court, thus replacing him in this most important
function of supervision.
It is difficult not to believe that reality is closer to what the authors
of the textbook describe as the normal course of events and that the
administration of justice, as well as the Party and the government, are
still largely controlled by people whose habits of action are modeled
after Stalinist traditions. These habits survive not only because a fair
number of the membership of the governing group carries memories of
the pre-Khrushchev era, but also because of the fundamental attitudes
of the leadership to unexpected developments, which in more liberal
societies are seen as a result of social change. Alleviation of terror
brought about an unacceptable demand for freedom of expression,
and a higher level of propserity produced greater pressure for durable
consumer goods and increased search for financial security, bringing in
its wake speculation and illicit commerce with gold and foreign curren-
cies. The reaction of the Soviet Government to these events which took
14 1975, No. 5, at 89-90.
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place in conditions of political and economic stability seems to suggest
that the Soviet administration of justice is not equipped to deal with
unexpected developments, which in open societies are not seen as a
danger to social equilibrium, and must resort to exceptional measures
reminiscent of the harsh reality of emergency and the early years of
the socialist construction.

